Politics Philosophy · 2 November 2011 ·
Popper: Irrefutable Marxism has been refuted?
It’s been an in-joke amongst Popper’s critics like Paul Feyerabend and Imre Lakatos that in the subject index of Popper’s Open Society and it’s Enemies lists Marxism as “—irrefutable” and “—refuted” at the same time (Lakatos & Feyerabend, 2010).
But for Popper this is not so much of a problem—he distinguishes between different kinds of Marxism, the original one proposed by Marx and the numerous attempts by his followers to evade refutation. He argues that the original position has indeed made potentially falsifiable predictions about the course of history, and these predictions have been refuted. One example for a falsified prediction of Marx’s theory is the establishment of communism in a non-industrial country like Russia. According to Marx, communism would start in a developed country with a sufficiently large worker’s population, rather than a rural country, like Tsarist Russia. Furthermore, the socialist government was not able to establish a state of governance that would have fulfilled Marx’s criteria of Socialism, and did not lead to a transition to communism1, but eventually faltered. These observations lead to a reinterpretation of Marxist theory, that accounted for all possible interpretations: Whatever happened, it became impossible to say: “Marxism didn’t account for that”, for it was possible to explain everything in with Marxist terminology. Thus Popper writes:
The Marxist theory of history, in spite of the serious efforts of some of its founders and followers, ultimately adopted this soothsaying practice. In some of its earlier formulations (for example in Marx’s analysis of the character of the “coming social revolution”) their predictions were testable, and in fact falsified. Yet instead of accepting the refutations the followers of Marx re-interpreted both the theory and the evidence in order to make them agree. In this way they rescued the theory from refutation; but they did so at the price of adopting a device which made it irrefutable. They thus gave a “conventionalist twist” to the theory; and by this stratagem they destroyed its much advertised claim to scientific status.
It is important to note that for Popper wasn’t so much concerned about truth, but how we get there. In his view, we cannot prove anything. But we can use a method of conjecting a theory, and then attempt to refute it. If it withstands these tests, there is probably more truth in it than in a theory that doesn’t. Popper used this to address the problem of demarcation, i.e. distinguishing between science and non-science. A scientific theory is any kind of theory that makes such predictions and the riskier the predictions are, the better the theory is. A non-scientific theory however does not make any risky predictions, and it is not possible to falsify it. Put together, this also means that a falsified scientific theory is still scientific, even if we may want to reject it on a factual level. However, an unfalsifiable theory is not, even if it is supported by all the evidence, because we cannot test it. This does not mean that it is factually wrong (although we cannot make any statements about this, because it is unfalsifiable).
Newer editions of Conjectures seem to have addressed this pun, as the above picture from my 2002 edition shows: Marxism has been “—refuted” and is “—made irrefutable”. (emphasis added) I am not sure whether old editions don’t, quite possibly Lakatos and Feyerabend just brushed over this for the lolz.
However, there is a serious point to make: As Lakatos and Feyerabend argue2, one of the weaknesses of Popper’s critical rationalism is, historically there can be considerable disagreement as to what counts as a falsification, and what we are supposed to do when one of many predictions of a theory fail. Thus, as Lakatos and Feyerabend argue, almost every falsifiable theory will be falsified at one point, but we may not (yet) wish to discard it. In reply, Popper conceded that scientific theories consist of a core hypothesis and auxiliary hypotheses, and these auxiliary hypotheses might be falsified without forcing us to reject the core. Instead, we may save the core hypothesis by suggesting a new, ad-hoc hypothesis. This solution however dilutes Popper’s critical rationalism considerably, and makes the stringent boundaries quite fuzzy again.
References
Lakatos, Imre & Feyerabend, Paul, (2010) For and Against Method: Including Lakatos’s Lectures on Scientific Method and the Lakatos-Feyerabend Correspondence, Chicago University Press
Popper, Karl R. (2002) Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge: London
Popper, Karl R. (1963) Science as Falsification (published in the 1963 edition of Conjectures and Refutations.
Popper, Karl R. (2002) The Open Society and its Enemies [Volume 2], Routledge: London
1 One might object that the Bolshevik regime does not represent what Marx considered as Socialism, but this has two pitfalls: 1) Why was Marx not able to predict this part of the history? 2) Such an interpretation also makes the predictions irrefutable unless it clearly specifies when and under which circumstances the ‘real’ Socialist revolution occurs.
2 I quote Feyerabend and Lakatos as if they were generally in agreement, but this agreement was largely restricted to their criticism of Popper. Their own positions were largely diametrically in opposition to each other. Whilst for Lakatos, there was at least some sort of progress, this notion was alien to Feyerabend: For him science had the same status as folk beliefs and neither one or the other brought progress that was worthwhile. Rather, we should believe whatever we feel is best for us, and remain sceptical over all attempts to describe the truth.
Politics Psychology · 14 October 2011 ·
When did you decide to become heterosexual?
The best way to present and argument isn’t always confrontational. Sometimes (or should I say often) it’s better to ask the right questions, so that they can work it out themselves. “When did you decide to become heterosexual?” is one of them. It’s not offensive, direct—and gets people thinking.
Thus Chris Baker and Travis Nuckolls went out to ask people whether they thought homosexuality is a choice, followed by the question “When did you decide to become heterosexual?” The attempt to resolve their cognitive dissonance is literary written on some interviewees’ faces. The innocence of the question also means that none of them is offended: It is indeed a valid question to ask. Good work!
(via Mädchenmannschaft)
Politics Tech-stuff · 9 October 2011 ·
Chaos Computer Club dissects German police interception software
The hacker group Chaos Computer Club (CCC) has reverse-engineered the German state trojan software that is being used to intercept suspects’ online communication. You can read the full summary of their findings on their website. It is not my aim to reiterate the technical details of how the software works, but the article also states:
The government malware can, unchecked by a judge, load extensions by remote control, to use the trojan for other functions, including but not limited to eavesdropping. This complete control over the infected PC—owing to the poor craftsmanship that went into this trojan—is open not just to the agency that put it there, but to everyone. It could even be used to upload falsified “evidence” against the PC’s owner, or to delete files, which puts the whole rationale for this method of investigation into question. […I]t is possible to watch screenshots of the web browser on the infected PC—including private notices, emails or texts in web based cloud services.
Thus the malware’s capabilities go beyond the boundaries set by the German constitutional court a few years ago. In particular it ignores the protection of personal space that is granted by the German Basic Law (the German constitution) and its ability to manipulate files on the suspects’ hard drive leads the forensic process ad absurdum: How can we trust evidence that is possibly manipulated? I understand that the police wants to tackle crime, and in doing so may feel obliged to cross boundaries—but these boundaries are there for a reason. They ensure that a suspect (or later the accused) is treated fairly and will receive a fair trial. If the evidence that has been collected as part of such a process is not reliable, then it may not be used in court anymore. Thus, such a trojan may prevent the very purpose of the surveillance, i.e. to collect data that can be used in court.
But with a piece of software like this, there is an interesting twist to it, that was picked up by Frank Schirrmacher, the editor of the German daily FAZ: Only few people are able to understand the real capabilities of the software, what it can and cannot do. A judge in court may not be able to assess whether the evidence collected through the malware is reliable and instead rely on the expertise of those who created the software. But according to the Ministry of the Interior the malware is secure, encrypted and stays within the boundaries of law. Here Schirrmacher refers to a statement by Lawrence Lessig, who proclaimed that “Code is Law”, i.e. that the way we interact on the internet and the digital sphere in general is not so much defined by state legislation, but rather by the software we use. Not law, but code sets the boundaries of what we can or cannot do online. Germany’s “federal trojan” is a perfect example of this: It was not the Basic Law that defined its abilities, but the code underneath. But until yesterday, the knowledge of what this code can actually do was left to the few.
It is this ignorance of the law and the purpose of the judicial system that is frightening. Unlike the security flaws it cannot be excused with incompetence, rather it shows an intentionality to violate the authority of the Basic Law and the boundaries it sets to interception of suspects by state authorities. The question for me, as a German citizen, is how the police is supposed to uphold the law if they violate it themselves?
Disclosure: I am a member of the CCC and attended the 24 Chaos Communication Congress. Otherwise I am a rather passive member.
Politics Science · 15 June 2011 ·
The impact of external funding: Deutsche Bank and the Quantitative Products Laboratory
Both, the German daily TAZ and the weekly Der Spiegel report that the Deutsche Bank has financed lectureships and research projects at Berlin universities, and supported the foundation of the Quantitative Products Laboratory, a research institute in applied financial mathematics. The institute was founded in 2006 and is a jointly operated between the Free University of Berlin and the Humboldt University of Berlin. This in itself isn’t unusual. However, the contract leaked by Peter Grottian, a former lecturer at the Free University, reveals the details and conditions of the financial support by Deutsche Bank, and is surprisingly explicit about the rights of the bank to influence the institutes’s research:
- The institute had to be in close proximity to Deutsche Bank, it moved into the same building as the bank’s “Investment & FinanzCenter” in Alexanderstraße.
- The institute had to display marketing material of Deutsche Bank.
- The institute may not mention the bank in published research without prior permission granted by the bank
- The bank reserves the right to send off members to oversee examinations.
- The bank reserves the right to veto the appointment of professors.
- The bank reserves the right to withhold publication of research if it conflicts with its economic interests, up to a maximum of two years.
All this is bad enough, but the worst is in my view the last point, i.e. the bank’s right to withhold publication, because it is particularly detrimental to the purpose of science as a mechanism of acquiring knowledge. Not only are the outcomes of research withheld, this in itself is only a minor issue. Whether or not a specific study is being published or not does not so much matter for scientific progress. Much worse is that it adds onto an already existing systematic bias of the published literature.
In science there are plenty of such publication biases. For example, journals tend to prefer publishing research that has significant results. Studies that fail to do so are often rejected, on grounds of lacking novelty. Thus, B. Goldacre describes the case of recently published article by D. Bem on precognition, or rather the ability to foresee the future. Whilst the original article was published due to its extraordinary findings, three further studies that replicated the experiment and found no effect were rejected on grounds of lacking novelty. But it is particularly the replication of prior research that is so vital in ensuring that the original findings are not just a statistical blip. If peer-reviewed journals withhold the publication of negative results and failed replications of prior research, they are no longer indicating the current state of scientific research. But I’m digressing.
Bias is already a big problem in scientific publishing, and it is worsened if another layer is left to interfere with it, by publishing research that supports its interests, whilst holding back the results that don’t. It leads to a skewed view of research and inhibits what science is all about: Progress and impartiality. If science is bound to the interests of companies, it will not be able to bring us closer to understanding the world.
Let me make up an example to illustrate my point (I have studied psychology, not financial mathematics, so it’s a bit arbitrary and vague): Let’s say a series of studies at the Quantitative Products Laboratory studied a particular kind of investment. Early research suggests it has high profit margins and the bank starts investing. However, later research reveals this kind of investment is not as safe as initially assumed. In this case the bank might make use of their right to withhold publishing, to disguise their false investments and not scare off current or potential customers. Thus, positive results would be published, the negative ones would get an extra hurdle they would have to take, and a skewed picture would emerge. Instead of leading to greater understanding of an issue, it leads to greater confusion and obfuscation.
Although the problem is not as prominent in areas like financial mathematics, its effects are much more prominent in medical research where drug companies have to make massive upfront investments to develop new drugs. The effects of withholding unfavourable research might even be lethal, if for example side effects of a new treatment are covered up, and only positive outcomes are published. And although most private funding contracts don’t grant explicit rights like the Deutsche Bank, interference often remains on an implicit level, between the funders and the operating research institute.
In the current economic climate many governments seek to reduce costly scientific research and would like to see private investors to step in. But if there is anything we can learn from examples given above, it is how vital independent, state-funded research is.
The contract between the universities and the bank is currently under revision, and both sides indicate that these terms will not remain. Furthermore, Deutsche Bank claims to not have made use of their right to withhold research. Cynics would reply that, given the close affiliation of the research institute to Deutsche Bank, this shouldn’t come as a surprise.
For further reading on publication biases, I can recommend J. Lehrer’s article The Truth Wears Off and D. H. Freedman’s article Lies, Damned Lies, and Medical Science.
German Politics · 16 May 2011 ·
Die Ökodiktatur: Ein Gespenst geht um Deutschland
Immer wieder taucht es auf, das Gespenst der Ökodiktatur, die die wehrlosen Bürger unterjocht und zur bewussten Lebensführung zwingt: Bald gibt es keine Wurststulle mehr, das Auto ist in Zukunft elektrisch und statt des Atomkraftwerks im Nachbarkreis steht wird bald ein Windrad im Garten stehen.
Der Grün-Rote Regierung in Baden-Württemberg ist nur die Speerspitze einer ganzen Ökodiktatur, der inzwischen sogar — Gott bewahre — die Union beigetreten ist und alle Deutschen zur Wärmedämmung zwangsverpflichten will. Lediglich die FDP ist der letzte Ort des freiheitlichen Widerstandes. Das ist zumindest das Bild, das Winand von Petersdorff in seinem letzten Beitrag in der FAZ zeichnet.
Doch irgendwie verheddert sich Von Petersdorf in seinem rethorischem Rundumschlag gegen das Böse: Einerseits ist die Ökodiktatur die Diktatur der Mehrheit, die der Minderheit der “Porsche-Fahrer, der Fernreisende[n], der Fleischesser[n]” die alle öffentlich am Pranger stehen (So von Petersdorf). Andererseits klagt er aber darüber, dass der Wille der Mehrheit gegen E10-Sprit ignoriert wird.
Die Argumentation lässt sich jedoch weiter ad absurdum führen: Deutschlandweit durchziehen Autostraßen die Landschaften und Städte. Wendet man die Argumentation von von Pertersdorf an, müssen sie wohl die Autodiktatur der Mehrheit darstellen, die Minderheit der Radfahrer unterdrückend.
Wenn Windkraftwerke die Diktatur darstellen, was sind dann die Atomkraftwerke?
Die zusätzlichen Starkstromleitungen, die die Windenergie eventuell erfordern wird (wobei auch hier künstlich erhöhte Zahlen von der Stromindustrie veranschlagt wurden und eventuell Bahnleitungen genutzt werden können), mögen nicht beliebt sein. Aber was ist mit denen, die schon gebaut wurden, kann man sie der Diktatur des Atom- und Kohlestroms zuordnen? Von Petersdorf kritisiert, dass die langen Förderungen für regenerative Energien nicht mehr der parlamentarischen Kontrolle unterliegen. Doch was ist mit dem Atommüll, der noch länger strahlen und Kosten verursachen, als die Solarfördung laufen wird? Die Katze beißt sich in den Schwanz: Wenn wir jetzt die Ökodiktatur haben, dann hatten wir vorher auch eine Diktatur — nur eine andere.
Vielleicht sollte man einfach mal auf dem Teppich bleiben. Der Staat hat immer schon in Wirtschafts- und Privatfreiheiten eingegriffen. Sicherheitsgurte und vorschriftsmäßige Beleuchtung sind solche Dinge, zum Beispiel. Die Freiheit des Einzelnen, alkoholisiert im Auto den Weg nach Hause anzutreten, ist eingeschränkt, weil dies eine Gefährdung der Mitmenschen [und nicht nur seiner selbst] darstellen würde. Hier wird das Wohl der Allgemeinheit über das des Einzelnen gestellt, und doch sehe ich niemanden aufschreien: “Diktatur!”.
Von Petersdorf stellt “Konsumentensouveränität” über Wahlergebnisse, er will lieber die Auto- statt die Ökodiktatur. Wie das Windrad im Garten sind politische Mehrheiten nur dann ok, wenn sie auf der richtigen Seite sind. Damit basiert seine Argumentation auf genau dem, was sie eigentlich kritisieren soll, nämlich dass Entscheidungen ohne das Zuziehen der Bürger getroffen werden. Doch auch hier verfehlt der Autor verfehlt das eigentliche Problem: Irgendeinen trifft es immer, irgendwer ist mit den Entscheidungen immer unzufrieden, selbst wenn sie absolut demokratisch vollzogen wurden. Das ist und war schon immer ein fundamentales Problem, wenn Menschen zusammenleben, über das sich Generationen von Philosophen den Kopf zerbrochen haben.
Auffällig ist, dass von Petersdorf diese Themen anschneidet. Er spricht von zukünftigen Generationen, Welthunger, Mehrheitsentscheidungen vs. Minderheitenschutz. Aber er führt die Gedanken nicht zusammen, spricht zum Beispiel nicht aus, das seine Argumentation zukünftigen Generationen keinen Anspruch auf ausreichend Ressourcen zulässt. Das bleibt nur impliziert. Geschickt werden auch die Probleme in der praktischen Implementierung einer nachhaltigen Lebensführung als prinzipielle Probleme dargestellt. Frei nach dem Motto “Schütte das Kind mit dem Bade aus, weil man es nie richtig sauber bekommt”. Das ist argumentativ mehr als enttäuschend, und leider reicht meine Zeit und meine Nerven nicht, den Artikel auch im Detail auseinanderzunehmen.
Psychology Politics · 8 March 2011 ·
How can this be...?
A man and his son were away for a trip. They were driving along the highway when they had a terrible accident. The man was killed outright but the son was alive, although badly injured. The son was rushed to the hospital and was to have an emergency operation. On entering the operating theatre, the surgeon looked at the boy, and said, “I can’t do this operation. This boy is my son.” How can this be?
(Source: Sanford, A. J. (1985). Cognition and cognitive psychology. London:Weidenfeld and Nicolson.)
Hint: The answer is actually very, very simple (yet quite a few people will get this wrong) and is related to today’s date.
Politics · 10 February 2011 ·
Democracy
The great danger in any democratic republic is the danger that people think democracy is an automaton—that is to say, an engine that goes of itself without any effort and that like the battery in the advertisement, it just keeps going and going and going. But, in fact, democracy doesn’t keep going and going and going. It requires the fuel of active citizenship. — Benjamin Barber
Thanks to Indra for finding this.
Politics · 28 November 2010 ·
Something worth protesting for?
Much of this is a response to Michael Goldfarb’s article Political Marching: What’s at risk? which contemplates on the rise of protesting in the UK that coincides with a loss of impact of protesting as a means to express discontent.
Probably all protests were considered as a public temper tantrum and/or doomed to fail at their time. Only in retrospective some become justified and historically meaningful. We cannot judge their success yet. The current protests against the cuts may not succeed in overturning the decisions of the government but future decisions might be affected.
Take the case of Germany where every few years there are massive protests against nuclear waste transports. Never have they ever succeeded in stopping the transport, they only slowed it down. Every single time protesters have used semi-legal and illegal tactics, very few of them have even resorted to violence. Trains were delayed, roads blocked, protesters chained themselves onto the rails, etc. Thousands of police officers try to control the crowds, the transports are horrendously expensive. Yet they have been going on for years, decades. All to no avail? Far from. Germany is amongst the first countries to disband nuclear power, even if the current government is attempting to undo legislation of the previous government. The Slogan “Atomkraft—Nein, danke!” (“Nuklear power—no, thanks!”) has become part of the German language inventory. Plans for a nuclear power plant in Wyhl and a reprocessing plant in Wackersdorf have been cancelled. Nuclear missiles were withdrawn from Mutlangen. (Source: Freitag)
But as always, cause and effect are difficult to determine. You could just as well argue that these may owe nothing to the protests but due to other social and political processes. This to me however seems like a classic chicken and egg question: What was there before—protests or attitudes? Attitudes or protests? In many ways people misunderstand the purpose of protests, and all the different ways they can function. They are not just a demonstration of power by the people. Often they are not. They are not representative (but you could say the same about many elections) But the common goal can unite those that are already concerned about the issue and may lead further their engagement by strengthening their own beliefs about their cause. These are relatively simple psychological processes.
Despite this, Goldfar might still be right in stating that protesting might not make an impact anymore, and that they lost most of their meaning today. I always picture politics as a battle not unsimilar to the evolution of a body and viruses: A body may constantly fight a virus, but sometimes the virus wins and its DNA becomes part of the host’s. But the host keeps fighting against new intruders, developing new mechanisms to shield the attacks, whilst the viruses are trying to find an algorithm to compete with the other one1.
Marching was one of these algorithms, and successful in a number of instances. But today, political systems may (or may not) become more and more immune against it. New ways have to be found, but that doesn’t mean old ones should be disbanded yet, and in some instances they might not be effective enough. However, unlike Goldfard, I would even argue there are not enough protests in the UK. None of the past protests have seriously brought the country to halt. Life goes on, as Goldfarb rightly remarks. Protests are perceived as an inconvenience, rather than a serious matter.
The fact that the number protests seem to be in the rise might partly be due to the fact that the (perceived) bar to get involved in politics has risen over time. Politics seems less accessible than it used to be, and voting has lost its significance. The party programmes of the Tories and Labour (and to a large extent eh Lib Dems, too) can be summarised under Thatcher’s slogan that “there is no alternative”. But if you are not being offered an alternative, whom would you vote for? Would you not search for alternatives?
As a foreigner living in the UK there is one thing that strikes me, and what provoked me to write this article is the lack of solidarity with protesters in general. Taking the recent student protests as an example, this tweet summarises the situation quite nicely:
@tom_watson: My boy is 5. If I save £100 a month ‘til he goes to Uni, it won’t pay his fees. I’m surprised parents aren’t marching too.
Free education matters. Even free higher education. It is argued that university education will provide you with a better salary and henceforth you should pay for it yourself. Frankly, not everyone is doing an MBA. (And not everyone with an MBA will end up with a high income) Studying is a financially risky endeavour, and with tuition fees, many of low income will not want to take it. The risks outweigh the potential benefits2:
@benjaminellis: I have four kids, and have taught them a strong ‘never be in debt’ ethic. Bang goes their education.
Just as bad, in my eyes, is the marketisation of education. Other people have already found better words, to which I would like refer. From the current debates you could almost think higher education is some sort of entertainment park or a big lottery. The debate is spun in a way that emphasises students’ prospective benefits whilst neglecting the overall contribution to society. In this way, students find themselves alone. But again, they do not reach out to other parts of the society. Yet, it seems to me that protests are only successful if they can draw upon the support of a significant share of the society.
In socialist Poland there were regular uprisings by the academics and the workers, but they were not successful until they joined forces under KOR and Solidarnosc. Similarly, the intellectuals in East Germany were unable touring about change—until they were able to mobilise the masses in the protests of Autumn 1989.
But this is what’s missing in Britain (and in Germany at the moment, too): Solidarity. Solidarity, even when it’s not you who’s targeted by a specific piece of legislation.
Back to the original article: Goldfarb seems to have an almost amusing concept of civil disobedience. On the one hand he complains about having to get off the bus to walk to his office because of protests and how horrible this is, on the other hand he thinks more civil disobedience might be the key. I’m afraid, I have sad news: Civil disobedience doesn’t necessarily make life more pleasant for everyone else. It’s not meant to. It’s supposed to be distracting, and many other forms of civil disobedience will also impact people who are not involved in the matter. Even more confused seems the statement that protesters are not willing to take legal risks by protesting. What does he want them to do? Is he encouraging them to set things on fire and storm the Tory headquarters? Surely not, and if already a blocked road causes distress and a withdrawal of solidarity, what about further actions? But here we face another chicken-and-egg problem: Is it the protests that reduce solidarity or is it the lack of solidarity that reduces support for protests?
Goldfarb is right however in noting that protests should become more creative, and a great example is Mark Thomas’ mass lone demonstration campaign.
All in all, I think the situation is “a little bit more complex than that”, ie. as Goldfarb wants to portray it. I do not think I can offer a comprehensive understanding of the situation either. In fact I see the potential for several Ph.D. theses here. But i would suggest it is too early to write off protests as a form of political participation altogether. Whether the students’ protests are going to be successful? I remain pessimistic, particularly if the media focuses primarily on violence. By emphasising the violence of the protests the media makes it appear as if this is the most effective part of the protest, as David Mitchell rightly remarks in today’s CIF. I do not think that violence is a viable option at all. In fact I think it is detrimental to the solidarity aspect I have highlighted earlier. And this, in my view, is what protests need to be successful.
1 Another, similar metaphor would be the one of hacking. Just as software developers are constantly fixing bugs, hackers are exploiting these until they are fixed. Not surprisingly, the notion of “hacking politics” has become an aspect of hacking culture and subject of many talks at Chaos Communication Congresses over the past few years.
Both examples seem to have a negative connotation, but this is mistaken: Viruses may increase our genetic diversity, making us more fit for life, in a similar manner good hackers will force software developers to fix security holes and to write better software. In just the same way, protests and minority can flag up problems in the society, which then can be addressed.
2 Of course there’s the notion of a graduate tax. We already have one—it is called income tax, but everyone’s too afraid to touch it.
Politics Psychology · 22 June 2010 ·
Jeremy Rifkin - The Empathic Civilisation
This is a really cool way to illustrate lecture content. This particular talk is by Jeremy Rifkin on the evolution of empathy. You can finde more videos like that on the RSA’s Youtube channel.
Politics · 20 June 2010 ·
Fnording the BP oil spill
German blogger and fnording specialist Fefe has digged out a couple interesting facts related to BP’s oil desaster. Thus BP’s CEO Tony Hayward has sold BP shares worth £1.4 million weeks before the catastrophe to finish off his mortgage for his house. This alone would not be newsworthy, if BP hadn’t been aware of problems with the Deepwater Horizon already in February. Make of that what you will, although personally I tend to believe in coincidence…
Either way, Hayward claims that he had not been aware of anything whatsoever. The Houston Chronicle has a number of well-entertaining quotes by Mr Hayward:
- “I was not involved in that decision. So it is impossible for me to answer that question.”
- On the money saved with certain well design decisions: “I’m afraid I can’t recall that.”
- On the time saved by some decisions on the well: “I don’t recall that either, I’m afraid.”
These are just three, and Houston Chronicle has some more, if you like. Such things never cease to amaze me. Managers and CEOs of large companies always claim that their extraordinary wages are due to their enormous responsibility they take for the company. Yet when something actually goes wrong they shy away and claim to have not been involved at all. So what are they being paid for, if I may ask? Being blissfully ignorant? Of course a CEO cannot possibly be involved in all decisions, yet at the same time it is his/her responsibility to ensure that his/her subordinates are, and act in a responsible manner. But maybe that is the key to the problem — companies are mainly responsible to their stakeholders, and not the public (or even the environment). Thus, decisions taken try to maximise profitability on the cost of responsibility. Yet at the same time free marketeers claim that we need even less regulation.
The most entertaining quote however is this one:
“With respect […] we drill hundreds of wells around the world,” Hayward told Rep. Michael Burgess, R-Texas. “Yeah, I know,” Burgess shot back. “That’s what’s scaring me right now.”
And just to keep you entertained, this brilliant sketch by John Clarke and Bryan Dawe: